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PUBLIC DEBT, PUBLIC DEBT MARKETS AND MONETARY
POLICY IN COLOMBIA
I. INTRODUCTION AND MACROECONOMIC OVERVIEW
The purpose of this paper is to examine the main macro- and micro-
interrelationships between public debt policy and monetary policy in
Colombia during 1995-1999, from the perspective of a central banker.
Emphasis will be given to the financial developments of the last two years,
a period in which Colombia´s capital markets have experienced significant
upheaval.
Over the last decade, the public sector, as well as the private sector, have
accumulated a significant stock of debt (both foreign and domestic).
Between 1990 and 1999, the central government debt /GDP ratio grew
57.9%, and between 1994 and 1999, it grew 212% (Graph1). In this last
period, as the result of an explicit strategy of the Ministry of Finance to
develop a domestic public debt market and reduce dependency on foreign
markets, the stock of domestic central government debt grew faster,
showing an increase of 257% as proportion of GDP (foreign debt grew
125%). Though government debt in Colombia is still relatively low
compared to that of many industrialized and developing economies ( 27 %
of GDP in the case of central government and around 35% of GDP for the
total public sector), there is a consensus that further accumulation of fiscal
deficits is no longer sustainable.
This debt accumulation posed serious policy dilemmas to monetary and
exchange authorities in the last decade. Given the increase in capital
inflows, in domestic demand and in asset prices that took place until 1995,
macroeconomic adjustment and inflation reduction were hard to achieve
and almost all the burden of adjustment fell upon monetary policy.
Meanwhile, the fiscal deficit, together with the external deficit, continued
to grow (Graphs 2 and 3). In the midst of a severe domestic political crisis
that had international implications (Colombia was "decertified" by the US
for being considered as a country that did not fully cooperate in the fight
against drugs), the declining trend in domestic savings continued to take
place during 1996-97, in great part due to the public sector; in this period,
economic growth started to slow down and asset quality started to
deteriorate in the financial sector. Before the emergence of the Asian crisis,
monetary policy was loosened somewhat (judging by the behaviour of3
interest rates), while the markets started to perceive that the exchange rate
policy was inconsistent with the fiscal policy, all of which created a highly
uncertain and volatile financial environment. At the end of 1997, the
nominal exchange rate hit the weak side of the crawling band which
defined the exchange rate control system.
During these years, given the Constitutional mandate of the central bank to
control price increases, the Colombian Central Bank (CB) did not fell into
the temptation of wiping out public debt through inflation. In fact, inflation
did fell 14 points between 1990 and 1997. But it did so in a very stubborn
and gradual fashion (Graphs 4 and 5), due to the ineffectiveness of the
macroeconomic policy mix to halt debt accumulation and growing
imbalances. By 1997 Colombia´s inflation record had long ceased to be
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impressive, as the average level of inflation between those two years was
23.5%, substantially higher than in most countries in Latin America and the
emerging world.
Then came what some have baptized the two "annus horribilus": 1998 and
1999. Colombia, as many other countries in the region, was heavily
affected by spillovers from the global market turmoil in 1998 and the
adverse terms of trade shock of that year. The effects of these shocks and of
their policy response were more traumatic than in other countries, given the
high levels of indebtedness, fragility of the domestic financial sector and
macroeconomic vulnerabilities just mentioned. In 1998, the current account
deficit peaked to 5.9% of GDP, the central government fiscal deficit
reached  4.9% of GDP (Graph 2) and real interest rates reached
unprecedented levels:  more than 15% for the 90 day deposit rate (Graph
3). The policy response to the shocks was a strong monetary tightening at
the beginning (May-September 1998), followed by a substantial nominal
exchange rate depreciation (September, 1998), monetary loosening
(October 1998 to present date) and exchange rate liberalization (September
1999); fiscal balances continued to deteriorate.
Graph 3. REAL interest rates, REAL 

































Real Wage Index, 1990=100
Real Exchange Rate Index, 1990=100
Real Interest Rates-Av.90 day deposits-(Right Axis)
Real Interest Rate (december)5
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The   adjustment  was  painful: in   1999  economic   growth  was   negative
  (-5.0%), for the first time in Colombia since the years of the great
depression, inflation came down in one year from 16.7% to 9.2% and the
external gap shrinked to 1.3% of GDP (Graph 5). Given the fact that the
central government public sector deficit was 5.3%, it was private sector
balances which were mostly hurt. The recession and the financial asset
crisis that followed generated a credit crunch from which only the
government Treasury seems to have benefited, as low risk government
securities have gained a substantial share in the assets portfolio of the
shrinked financial sector. At present (first week of January 2000) the
government is placing three year fixed rate bonds at record low annual
interest rates: 10.5% nominal (1.3% real).
According to many analysts, the defense, or attempt to defend, the
exchange rate regime (a crawling band system) by the central bank should
be fully blamed for the substantial increase in real interest rates and the
liquidity and credit crunch that took place in 1998-99. It is not the purpose
here to discuss the validity of this argument .We will argue, however, that
public debt and public debt market underdevelopment played an important
role in making the 1998-99 external and financial crisis more costly than
what would otherwise have been.
On one hand, had Colombia accumulated less public (and private) debt, the
economy would have not been so vulnerable to the 1998 shocks; most
probably, inflation and real exchange rate appreciation had been lower and
net savings and growth would have been higher. On the other, as we will
show below, the hike in money market interest rates was in some months
much higher than what was desired by the authorities due to imperfections
in the capital market; monetary transmission mechanisms failed to work
properly, and the implementation of open market operations against public
securities was severely constrained due to segmentation and lack of depth
and liquidity in the public debt market. In contrast with industrialized
countries that started to use indirect market monetary policy instruments
when public securities markets were already developed, Colombia started
to use these instruments without having  the market, and in the middle of
one of the most turbulent financial periods ever experienced. In other
words, Colombia has suffered the weight of the old familiar truth: "public
debt is bad, but public debt markets are good".
Monetary policy, in turn, has had important effects on public securities
markets. Over the past decade, monetary authorities have increasingly
relied on indirect instruments for monetary control purposes, and
particularly on open market operations (OMOs). As from the beginning of7
1998, OMOs have been carried out mainly against public paper. A 1992
law, moreover, obliged the CB to operate in the market using exclusively
public debt paper as from January 1999 onwards. This has undoubtedly
contributed to increase liquidity in the market, though not without problems
and drawbacks for the future development of the market. As we will
explain in detail below, due to an understandable fear of promoting further
public debt growth through the secondary purchase of public securities,
monetary authorities restricted the use of certain public securities for
OMOs; unfortunately, these measures ended up contributing to segmentate
and distort the securities market while they had very little, or nill, effect on
the fiscal deficit.
The CB has also played an important role in modernizing the market
through the provision and administration of an electronic trading system,
SEN, which started to operate in November, 1998. Though the SEN project
faced many problems in its initial stages and its operation was delayed
several months, in its short life it has contributed enormously to increase
transparency in the market and has helped to create benchmark prices. The
CB is also the main custodian of public securities, and payments and
settlement of these securities are managed electronically by the CB under a
delivery versus payment system.
The Ministry of Finance (MoF), on the other hand, has made substantial
efforts in the last four years to improve the primary market for TES-B
through a program of regular auctions, pre-announcing the type of
instruments to be issued and the corresponding amounts. These primary
auctions are administered by the CB, under MoF guidelines. Additionally,
at the end of 1997,  just before the financial crisis exploded, the
government appointed  a group of, roughly, 20 financial institutions as
official market makers (officially designated primary bond-dealers and
potential candidates for primary dealers) with the stated objective of
improving liquidity in the government securities market. This program is
also co-administered by the CB. Unfortunatelly, however, due to an
unfavourable economic environment and lack of a truly comprehensive
program of market development, all these efforts have not been very
successful in improving market liquidity.
The Colombian experience of the last years is yet another example of how
important it is for monetary policy effectiveness to have enough depth and
liquidity in the public debt market, and how important it is to have CB
authorities aware of this fact and promoting market development. It is also
an interesting case study to understand how difficult it is to achieve this8
awareness and commitment when there is macroeconomic vulnerability,
highly volatile markets and many institutional and legal restrictions.
The challenges that lie ahead are enormous, both in terms of
macroeconomic adjustment and capital market rationalization and
modernization . As is well known, at the end of last year Colombia signed
an Extended Fund Facility Agreement with the IMF. The macroeconomic
adjustment program contemplated under this agreement foresees a
substantial and permanent reduction in the Colombian non-financial public
sector deficit; debt ratios should therefore stabilize at current levels and
reduce gradually after year 2003. If everything works out well, real growth
should resume to 3% in year 2000 and gradually increase to 5% in 2002,
while inflation is supposed to drop to 6% in two years.
One of the main economic
1 risks of the whole program is the future
performance of the financial sector, which continues to be extremely
vulnerable. If bank’s assets continue to deteriorate at present rates (which
are higher than what was foreseen initially), fiscal or monetary targets
might not be easily accomplished. On one hand, Fogafin, the Colombian
Deposit Insurance Fund which is a decentralized public agency responsible
for financial sector rescue programs
2, could face budget problems or will
have to issue more debt. If an inflationary adjustment is to be avoided and
the financial strength and credibility in this Fund is to be maintained, new
debt issues by Fogafin must be backed somehow by Central Government
resources. Apart from mining the credibility in the economic adjustment
program, this would inevitably continue to crowd out private credit
resources for the private real sector, delaying economic growth. On the
other hand, financial sector vulnerability could constraint monetary policy
and induce unsustainable low interest rates, which in turn could generate
further exchange rate depreciation and/or inflation. If this negative scenario
does not occur and private balances recover, anyway, it is very unlikely
that domestic borrowing will continue to be as cheap for the government as
it has been in the last weeks.
To sum up, though there is consensus that the right steps have been taken to
put the house in order, there is still uncertainty and vulnerability in
financial markets and this might keep real interest rates volatile and at
                                          
1 Of course, political and legal risks are equally, or more, important to guarantee future stability.
If the latter continue to be a source of investment risk, it will be very difficult to achieve fiscal and
overall macroeconomic adjustment.
2 Different from last resort liquidity facilities, which are, of course, a CB responsibilities.9
higher than desired levels. As Dornbusch
3 would have put it: more
unpleasant monetarist and fiscal arithmetic may have to be done.
The other big medium-term priority and challenge is to develop a long term
development vision of capital and public debt markets. Of course, a
necessary condition for this development to occur is macroeconomic
stability: fiscal reform, stable inflation and (sustainable) low interest rates.
But it also requires coordinated policy actions and changes in the
regulatory and institutional framework;  a joint effort between the CB,
MoF, Securities Superintendency, Banking Superintendency and Fogafin,
among other institutions. As some members of an IMF mission recently put
it, capital market underdevelopment "limits the scope for a rapid recovery
and constitutes an important indirect source of systemic risk".
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II briefly reviews the
main institutional arrangements in Colombia under which public debt and
monetary policies are designed, coordinated and implemented. Section III
provides an overview of the development of the domestic market for public
securities in Colombia. Section IV examines the aforementioned dilemmas
and contradictions of monetary and fiscal policies from a microeconomic
perspective, offering some concrete examples of how public securities-
market underdevelopment have hindered monetary policy effectiveness.
Section V concludes with some policy recommendations.
II. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
In order to understand the interactions between public debt- and monetary
policy in Colombia, it is useful to know some basic facts about the
institutional framework and political economy environment under which
these policies are designed. We believe the following are the most
important:
  "Independent" Central Bank (CB). The Political Constitution of 1991
created an "autonomous" Central Bank (CB) subject to its own legal
regime, with responsibility for maintaining the purchasing power of the
currency. The CB Board is responsible for monetary, exchange rate and
financial policies in Colombia. It should design such policies in
coordination with the government, and the functions assigned to the CB
should be carried out in coordination with general economic policy
(mainly, the macroeconomic program approved by the National Council
                                          
3 See Dornbusch (1997)10
on Economic and Social Policy, CONPES). The Central Bank Law of
1992 states explicitly that exchange policy must be determined in
agreement with the Minister of Finance. In the event of failure to reach
agreement, the constitutional responsibility to maintain the purchasing
power of the currency shall prevail.
  (However) The Minister of Finance is a member of and chairs the
Board of Directors of the CB. This Board comprises other six
members:  the General Manager of the CB and five members who serve
in that capacity alone and are appointed by the President of the Republic
for renewable four-year terms, with replacements of two of them every
four years. The General Manager is appointed by the Board for a four
year term. The presence of the Minister is required for a quorum.
  CB direct lending to the government requires unanimous approval
from all Board members; at present (and since 1992) the CB cannot
purchase public debt instruments in the primary market. Voluntary
purchases of government securities in the secondary market (indirect
lending) are permitted, such as outright operations, repurchase
agreements and the acquisition of government paper as collateral for
rediscount credit facilities to the financial sector. CB earnings or profits
(net of reserves to cover future losses) belong to the nation and any
fiscal year losses must be covered with resources from the national
budget
4. The Political Constitution of 1991 also prohibits direct lending
to private individuals (other than liquidity support to financial
institutions and the intermediation of external credit).
  Open market operations with public securities. Law 51 of 1990 gave
authority to the CB to place government securities (-TESA -acquired by
the CB before 1991) in the market for monetary control purposes. The
resources thereby acquired could not be transferred to the government.
In the Central Bank Law of 1992 (Law 31 of 1992) the authority to
operate in the market with government securities was kept and an
additional mandate was incorporated: as from January, 1999, all CB
open market operations (both outright purchases and/or sales and
repurchase agreements) should be carried out exclusively with
government securities.
  CB approval of public indebtedness. By the initiative of Congress, the
CB Board must formally express its opinion on the macroeconomic
                                          
4 Before 1992, the effect of a nominal depreciation on the value of foreign assets was
monetization, as this adjustment was transferred by the CB to the government. This was for
yeras, an important source of government financing.11
effects of new foreign and domestic public indebtedness contemplated
in each annual budget bill proposed by the government to Congress. The
CB, however, has no direct power to veto such proposal; it only has
potential indirect power to the extent that it is able to  Congress agrees
with.
  Public debt issues require prior approval from the CB Board. The
aforementioned Law of 1992 gives the CB authority to regulate capital
markets and public debt issues. More specifically, it establishes that the
CB is responsible for "…determining the financial conditions under
which public entities shall issue or buy securities… with the aim of
insuring that these operations take place at market prices. If those
conditions are not met, the corresponding securities can not be issued or
placed"
5 . In practice, CB intervention in public debt policy has gone as
far as prohibitting -or not approving- the issue of short term (less than
one year maturity) public debt bonds or bills.
  MoF is responsible for main debt management functions
(Department of Public Credit).  The Ministry of Finance (MoF) is
responsible for functions such as planning: projection of fiscal
requirements and formulation of debt program frequency, volume,
issuance by instrument, etc.; short-term management of primary market
including definition of issuance volumes and borrowing and auctions
calendar; definitions of guidelines for the operation of primary auctions
by the CB; direct placements of debt via special arrangements (captive
buyers) with other public entities; active debt public management;  and,
in coordination with the CB, management of primary dealers (and
candidates for primary dealers).
  The CB is fiscal agent of the government and in that capacity it makes
payments, including servicing of principal and interest payments to
public bond holders, and receives payments. The Treasury has two
deposit accounts in the CB: one to manage payments of public debt
securities and the other to manage other cash operations. There are no
formal arrangements between the Treasury and the CB to manage
government cash balances, but the Treasurer and CB staff meet on a
weekly or bi-weekly basis (Comité de Tesorería) to share information
and sometimes coordinate cash balances movements in order to avoid
sharp fluctuations in the monetary base. At present the Treasury does
not have access to remunerated deposits at the CB and cannot purchase
(neither outrightly nor temporarily) securities from the CB.
                                          
5 Almost literal translation of Article 16, section "c" of Law 31 of 1992.12
  The CB  is custodian and administers public securities' payments
and settlement. The CB is also the main custodian of public securities,
and payments and settlement of these securities are managed
electronically by the CB under a delivery versus payment system.
III.    RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GOVERNMENT DEBT
MARKET IN COLOMBIA
Colombian capital markets, as in many developing economies, continue to
be highly illiquid and have a very limited investor base; this is particularly
so in the case of stocks and private securities, were size is even lower than
in other emerging economies. The private real sector is therefore highly
dependent on traditional credit financing by financial intermediaries and
there is little risk spreading through portfolio and debt diversification in the
economy in general.
In this environment, short term fixed income trading, dominated by
financial intermediaries (particularly banks), is the most important and
sector of Colombian capital markets. Due to high and variable inflation
rates for a lengthy period, the bond market is concentrated on the short end
of the yield curve.
Given the impressive growth of domestic government debt over the last
decade (Graph 1), government securities have gained a substantial share in
the domestic bond market. The reasons for this growth are two-fold: a) On
one hand, as mentioned earlier, the central government deficit started to
soar since 1992 to reach record hights of more than 5% in 1999 (Graph 2),
b) On the other, since 1993
6, the MoF has developed a debt strategy
consisting of reducing the former concentration on foreign obligations and
promoting domestic noninflationary financing through domestic debt
issues. In 1991, foreign debt accounted for almost 80% of  total
government debt; since 1994, that share has dropped down to a 52-%50%
range.
The public debt market consists mainly of bonds or notes issued by the
Treasury, denominated TES-B. Up to date, primary government securities
issues by the MoF have been guided by the objective of satisfying the
government’s financing needs, not by monetary objectives. The CB
                                          
6 The first auction ever of Treasury fix-rate bonds took place in February 12, 1993.13
operates only in the secondary market and in the past (until early 1998)
issued its own paper for monetary control purposes.
Apart from the MoF, decentralized government agencies such as the
agricultural development bank, Finagro, and more recently, Fogafin, the
Deposit Insurance Fund, are important issuers of public paper (Títulos de
Desarrollo Agropecuario-TDAs- and Bonos Fogafin, respectively). In
1995, the outstanding stock of TES-B amounted to around $2.3 billion,
slightly more than 50% of the total central government debt.  At current
prices, today that stock is valued at  $19,300 billion (it has grown in real
terms at an average annual rate of around 22% since 1994) and represents
94% of total central government bond market, as shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Composition of Public Debt Bond Market (end of 1999)
Trillions of pesos Share in subtotal Share in total
Central Government Debt
TESA 0.37 1.8% 1.4%
TES B 19.28 94.0% 74.3%
Bonos Seguridad 0.41 2.0% 1.6%
Bonos Ley 160 0.09 0.4% 0.3%
Bonos Educativos 0.03 0.2% 0.1%
Bonos Agrarios 0.00 0.0% 0.0%
Valor Constante 0.07 0.4% 0.3%
Bonos Cesantía 0.04 0.2% 0.2%
Bonos Solidaridad 0.20 1.0% 0.8%
Subtotal 20.51 100.0% 79.0%
Other Decentralized public agencies debt
Bonos Fogafín 3.51 64.4% 13.5%
TDA 1.93 35.4% 7.4%
Bonos Forestales 0.01 0.2% 0.0%
Subtotal 5.45 100.0% 21.0%
Total 25.96
Source: DCV-Banco de la República
All these bonds that compose the public bond capitalization are very
heterogeneous. Some of them, such as the TDAs issued by Finagro, are
forced investments by banks and other financial intermediaries. The Bonos
Fogafín are a wide range of instruments (mostly floaters, tied to the
benchmark 90day deposit rate DTF, and whose maturity ranges from less
than a year to 10 years) issued last year to finance debtor relief programs
and capitalization programs as part as a comprehensive financial rescue
package designed by the government. As we will explain in detail below,  a14
great part of central government securities, including most of TES-B, are
also placed through non-market mechanisms.
Despite the financial liberalization reforms of the early 1990s and
government attempts to promote market development, overall, the
Colombian market for public securities is extremely thin and segmented;
bonds are not liquid and in many cases that liquidity is provided only by
the central bank (that is particularly true in the case of the recently issued
Fogafin bonds and some TES-B). Public debt instruments are placed within
captive buyers such as banks (in the case of forced investments) pension
funds or decentralized public entities (such as ISS, the Social Security
Institute, and Ecopetrol, the public oil company) which can be enforced to
invest in government bonds (today, 65% of the outstanding stock of TES-B
is in the hands of the non-financial public sector). In many cases,
placements continue to be at below market rates, though this practice has
diminished substantially in the last years.
As mentioned in the introduction, since 1994, the MoF has made
significant efforts to improve the primary market for TES-B through a
program of regular auctions, pre-announcing the type of instruments to be
issued and the corresponding amounts. At the end of 1996, despite this
being a very dynamic year for primary auctions, only 12.1% of the stock of
TES-B was issued through this mechanism. Today that share is 20%; in
1997,1998 and 1999, auction placements increased at annual rates of 173%,
45% and 33%, respectively. There has been progress also in standarizing
instruments to insure fungibility, but recent issues of Fogafin Bonds and
TES-B to rescue fragile financial institutions through debt relief and
capitalization programs
7 have significantly hindered that effort.  For
example, most Fogafin Bond interest payments float quarterly (tied to
DTF), unlike floater TES which are indexed to inflation
8 and they are not
backed by full faith and credit by the government. At present, almost only
the CB accept Fogafin Bonds as collateral for repo and rediscount credits,
so there is no secondary market for these bonds.
In November, 1997, the MoF launched a "Primary Dealer" system to
promote liquidity in the TES-B market. Under this system, a group of
                                          
7 Fogafin has given loans to financial institutions to bring the risk weighted capital adequacy
ratio up to 10%, through direct placement of bonds with these institutions.
8 One of the reasons for choosing DTF indexed debt was to be able to match liabilities in
savings and loans which are indexed to DTF and help reduce the interest gap in these
institutions. regarded as cheaper than inflation indexed debt (7.7% vrs. 9% real rates,
respectively), and that was the reason for having chosen it (why doesn´t the gov.issue DTF
inxed debt as well?).15
financial agents is chosen with the stated objective of fostering growth in
the primary and secondary market for these securities; these dealers have
obligations to the government and enjoy some privileges which enhance
their own private incentive to develop the market. Currently, there are 11
oficially designated primary dealers (mostly banks) and 9 candidates for
primary dealership, all of which we will call here "market makers".
Minimum capital requirements
9 and and minimum risk ratings (more than
BBB- or BBB for D&P and Bank Watch) have to met in order to be a
market maker. The CB evaluates each market maker´s performance,
following specific guidelines given by the MoF; at the end of the year each
agent gets a specific mark or rating. In this evaluation, activity in the
secondary market is given more weight than primary trading in this
evaluation. If a minimum rating is not achieved, the agent will cease to be a
market maker, or a designated primary dealer might lose its franchise and
be replaced by a candidate. It is belived that this system puts more pressure
on dealers to enhance liquidity in the market.
The most important privileges enjoyed by market makers are the following:
exclusive right to bid or participate in primary TES auctions; exclusive
access to market maker meetings with MoF and CB staff; and exclusive
access to the first trading "floor" in the electronic trading system SEN.
Only designated primary dealers have exclusive access to second rounds of
TES auctions. Their main obligations are: be very active biding for sale and
purchase in the first SEN trading floor and produce information and
documents to their clients on market developments.
During the financial turmoil of 1998, both the perceived commitment of the
government to develop the market and the efficiency of primary dealers to
develop demand came into jeopardy.
Table 2.   Yield Volatilities (average standard daily deviations)
January 1996- January 1999
1 year Treasury Bills Secondary Market. 1.09
2 year TreasuryNotes Secondary Market 1.44
1 year TES Primary Market 5.45
2 year TES Primary Market 4.88
1 year TES Secondary Market 5.71
2 year TES Secondary Market 5.49
                                          
9 Stock Brokers: $5 billion; banks: $25 billion; Financial Corporations: $15 billion.16
The reasons for less credibility in the government’s commitment to the
program are the following:
  As can be seen in Graph 6 and Table 2, volatility in the Colombian
public securities market has been extremely high, compared both to
previous levels and to that of developed markets such as the US
Treasury Bill market.  Given the sharp rise in interest rates during 1998,
on several occasions  the government elected to reject the bids presented
by market makers in the primary auctions, declaring the options void.
Graph 6. Yield Volatilities of Public Debt 
Instruments
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This response, of course, undermined credibility in the government’s
commitment to be in the market both in the good and the bad times.
According to many analysts, this fact helped to fuel capital outflows
from international institutional investors who were already under the
contagion effects of the international financial crisis and whose
Colombia country risk perception was already at record hights given the
magnitude of the twin external and fiscal deficits. As is shown clearly in
Graph 7, the foreign investor base in the TES market that was created
during 1995-97 disappeared in a couple of months. This capital outflow
was undoubtedly one of the causes of the attack against the peso and CB
reserves during 1998.
  Despite growth in auction amounts and promises to reduce non-
transparent operations with captive buyers in late 1997, the government
continues, increasingly, to operate a parallel and captive market to
distribute directly significant quantities of their securities. More than
80% of the total outstanding debt in TES-B has been placed through
these special arrangements, and this share is expected to increase in
2000 (Graph 8) 
10. As mentioned above, some public sector companies
are required to invest their excess liquidity in government securities
through direct transaction with the Treasury (inversiones forzosas);
these investments can not be traded in the secondary market. The Social
Security Institute (ISS) is also obliged to invest its resources in such
securities,  but  has the  option of  buying  them  in  either the secondary
                                          
10 At the end of 1996, 12.2% of total outstanding TES-B was placed by auction ($724.1
billion) and the rest was placed via special arrangements by the Treasurer with the ISS
(4.3%), Garantía TAN (3.1%) and “Sustitución DSI” (0.3%).
Graph 8. Composition of Stock of TESB 
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market or directly from the Treasury (inversiones convenidas). Since
1997, these investments are supposed to be placed at “near to market”
prices: more specifically, at the rate of the last primary auction.
  Many market makers and analysts believe the government has been
ambiguous with respect to its intention to extend the yield curve and, in
particular its commitment to use fixed income bonds for this purpose.
As can be seen in Graphs 9-11 the range of instruments issued by the
MoF has broadened significantly over the last three years, and the
structure of the market by type of instrument has been quite unstable. In
1996 there were basically three types of instruments in the secondary
market: fix rate bonds for shorter maturities (1, 2 and 3 year maturities);
a 6 year maturity floater tied to monthly inflation
11 and a 15 year
maturity yearly floater bought by the ISS (through arranged
placements)
12. In the second half of 1998, just after the exchange rate
band was depreciated 9%, the government introduced US dollar
denominated bonds
13; in 1999, it stopped issuing the 7 year floaters and
opened a new issue of indexed bonds denominated in units of constant
real value called UVRs
14. At present it issues 1,2 and 3 year fixed
bonds, 5 and 7 year inflation indexed bonds and dollar indexed bonds.
The rationale for these changes in structure and the use of this diverse
range has proven very confusing. Market participants view the
introduction of these instruments as opportunistic behaviour by the
MoF, with the sole purpose of mobilizing more (and cheaper) funding to
the growing fiscal deficit.           
It was this same view what determined that the CB Board did not accept a
proposal by the MoF to issue treasury bills of less than one year- maturities
in early 1998, when real interest rates started to rise. The Director of the
Ministry’s Public Debt Department had argued that it was important to
issue these bills to complete the short end of the yield curve and to
facilitate cash management by the Treasurer. The CB authorities, however,
perceived that approving these new issues would only help increase the
deficit and the vulnerability of public finances, and no market development
considerations were taken into account in that opportunity.
                                          
11 The first auction of 6 year floater bonds took place in June 14, 1995.
12 These bonds were issued in 1994 and in 1998. Each august the MoF reports the rate of this
annual floater. Currently the yield of these bonds is annual consumer price inflation plus 1.28
points.
13 The first US dollar TES auction took place in October 29th, 1998.
14 The first auction of UVR denominated bonds took place in May 25
th, 1999.19
Market makers complain the government has been very inconsistent in its
issuance of short term (1 year) TES in the past, of which there is not
enough stock at present. Many of the past 1 year notes have been replaced
by 2 or 3 year maturities, extending average maturity and causing a vaccum
of short term issues. Inconsistent issue size and maturities affect the market
via uneven future liquidity of those same series of bonds.

































Graph 9. Stock of TES B by Type of Instrument
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Authorities, on the other hand, have the perception that market makers,
even controlling for the effect of a very unstable macroeconomic
environment, have not made enough efforts to promote liquidity. Currently,
around 75% of the portfolio in the hands of financial intermediaries is held
for trading (Graph 12) and it has to be marked to market. Most trading has
taken place in the repo market, a substantial part of which takes place with
the central bank. Once the economy stabilizes and authorities strengthen
their commitment to a comprehensive plan to develop the market, it would
be advisable to review the whole market maker program. More strict and
accurate parameters to evaluate market-making performance should be
introduced, as well as more effective positive incentives to be a market
maker.
Though demand for longer term indexed bonds has increased in the last
years (Graphs 13-14), the term structure of TES-B placed by auctions
shows that demand continues to be concentrated in short term maturities (1,
2 and 3 years). Once markets calmed slightly in 1999, the MoF was able to
increase the average maturity of new bond issues from 1.5 years in 1998 to
2.9 years. Over the last decades, high and unstable inflation rates have been
the main obstacle to develop long-term financial savings in Colombia. As
mentioned earlier, at present inflation is at its lowest levels in decades. If
price changes continue to be at one-digit levels, it is the right moment to
start developing a long-term capital market.
Graph 12. Marketable and Non-marketable shares in total 












































Tradable Investments Non-Tradable Investments21
Most probably, the government will continue to issue indexed bonds to
capture long term savings, particularly if inflation expectations continue to
be higher than actual inflation, as has happened in the last months. This has
the potential advantage of introducing the right stimulus for government to
diminish pressure on the CB to inflate the economy and reduce the debt
burden. However, many would argue, I beleive correctly, that strengthening
a constitutency of inflation-averse investors in fixed rate long term bonds in
some cases is more effective to reduce the temptation to inflate the
economy. Additionally, competition with the financial private sector
issuing long term indexed financial products will be tough. In order to
solve the interest and maturity gap problem currently affecting the
Colombian savings and loans system, the same government is promoting a
new housing financing system, similar to the Chilean, based on the issue of
long term indexed bonds.


























From a different perspective, it would be very useful to issue longer term
fix rate bonds to extend the yield curve; at present there are no nominal
long term reference or benchmark rates in Colombia. Market makers argue
that indexed instruments are not attractive to the market due to the fact that
uncertain cashflows for long maturities requiere traders and investors to
assign the most conservative estimates of coupon and principal cashflow
when calculating their VaR values. Additionally, due to seasonal changes
in monthly inflation, there are sharp cycles in prices and traded volume,
with investors "piling in" during perceived months of high inflation and
"piling out" in the months of lean inflation after the first quarter of the year.
All this makes the market for these securities very illiquid.
To sum up, there is evidently a trade-off between indexed and fixed rate
bonds, and perhaps it would be desirable to have both in sufficient amounts
Graph 14.  Composition of Primary TES Issues by maturity
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1 year 15 Months 2 years 3 years 5 years23
as to make their markets relatively liquid. If there is a good  combination of
floaters and fixed rates for equal maturities in the market, this has the
advantage of being able to better monitor inflation expectations in the
economy. It is interesting to note that the spread between the 1 year- note
and the 2 and three year- notes has been relatively large throughout 1999
(Graph 15), indicating that despite the drop in inflation, agents continued to
expect higher interest rates in the future. If the MoF decides to issue a fix-
rate 5 year bond in 2000, it would be a nice way to test credibility in the
inflation targets programmed for 2000-2005.   
At this stage, it is not clear whether the government will continue to issue
dollar indexed bonds, and/or in what amounts. Judging by the behaviour of
the two-year- dollar indexed primary yields in 1999 (Graph 16), peso
devaluation expectations have decreased since the peso started to float in
late September. It is important to point out that there are regulations that
distort demand for this type of instrument. On one hand, since 1998, but
particularly since August 1999 when the peso was under a second
speculative attack which ended in the elimination of the crawling band
exchange rate system and the introduction of a floating regime, the CB
restricted the dollar credit cash position that banks can have. Due to this
restriction, in order to be able to hedge uncovered debit positions, banks
have demanded dollar indexed TES. Another piece of regulation which
creates (in a way, artificial) incentives to demand these TES is preferential
treatment in terms of capital requirements for derivatives that are covered
with dollar indexed TES (if they are covered with other dollar denominated
asset they do not have this treatment).
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In order to have more liquid, transparent and efficient public bond markets
in the future, both the MoF and the CB must design a comprehensive
market development plan with a clear long-term vision. This vision has to
be communicated and transmitted to other regulatory public agencies which
directly or indirectly effect the market such as the Banking
Superintendency and the Securities Superintendency, among others.
Among regulatory issues that need urgent reform, we could mention the
following:
  Securities lending, which was prohibitted in Colombia until March,
1999, is still subject to many restrictions (particularly regarding
accounting principles).
  Though in 1998 the CB led a reform to eliminate quantitative
restrictions on gross amounts of short repo operations, there are still
some restrictions on the repo market. For example, securities used as
collateral backing any repo contract can not be used by the temporary
holder to do other operations and they are held frozen in the respective
account administered by the custodian (the CB).
  Institutional investors, in particular pension funds, are subject to
portfolio investment regulations that currently distort prices and hinder
the development of this demand sector
15. As stressed by a recent IMF
mission, the regulatory structure governing mutual funds should be
rationalized, guaranteeing more competition among financial
institutions offering mutual funds, among other aspects.
Before entering to examine the way the CB has operated in the market, this
section will end with a positive note regarding recent developments in
trading infrastructure. As mentioned in the introduction, in November
1998, the CB put in operation an electronic trading system, SEN. By
October 1999, more than 60% of electronic trading was done through SEN
(Graph 17). This system, which is centralized and administered by the CB,
has substantially improved transparency and efficiency in the secondary
market for TES-B. Before, most trading took place through the stockmarket
system were prices are severly distorted (among other reasons, because in
most cases it is impossible to separate yields from fee rates payed to the
broker).
                                          
15  The majority are fixed income funds, invested in securities that mature in one year or less.25
IV.  MONETARY POLICY AND PUBLIC DEBT MARKETS
DEVELOPMENT
Like in many other countries, OMOs have become the CB´s main
instrument for altering the stock of money. Though traditionally monetary
reserve requirements have been a key tool of monetary control in
Colombia, in recent years, however, the level of reserve requirements has
been reduced from an average of 27% in 1992-94 to 4.5% at the end of
1999. Reserve requirements were kept relatively high compared to other
countries in the region during most of the 1990s. During the 1998 crisis
these reserves were substantially diminished as a means to provide liquidity
to the banks and help prevent a systemic payments crisis
16. Nowadays, CB
authorities rely almost exclusively on OMOs to control liquidity in the
markets and on a rediscount credit window to provide lender of last resort
facilities.
Since the 1980s,  the CB started to develop several techniques and
instruments of indirect monetary policy. As is often the case, when the CB
initiated the transition to use mainly indirect monetary policy instruments
in the early 1990s, there was excess liquidity in the financial system and
open market operations were used almost exclusively for contractionary
purposes. This excess liquidity was inherited by policies during direct
                                          
16 A substantial portion of liquidity demand during the second half of 1998 was provided through
the reduction in these requirements.
Graph 17
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control policies and fueled by the significant accumulation of foreign assets
during the period of foreign capital inflows (1990-1995).  Up to 1997, the
CB chose to issue its own securities for monetary control purposes (called
Títulos de Participación, TP) rather than use government securities. The
reason for this was two-fold: on one hand, the 1991 Constitution gave
autonomy to the CB and the idea of implementing monetary policy through
primary government issues was simply not viable. On the other, secondary
markets of public securities were extremely thin and segmented to be able
to implement OMOs with government paper. Additionally, since the CB
was traditionally a net debtor of the financial system, it needed to build
enough stock of public securities to insure that it could issue all the
amounts needed to achieve monetary objectives. The CB held in its
portfolio only less than one trillion pesos in the form of TES-A acquired in
the early 1990s through a special arrangement with the government (Graph
18), which was certainly not enough to meet contractionary needs (Graph
19). Though the CB could have mixed the use of TPs and TES-A for
OMOs, it never sold its TES-A (definitely or on a temporary basis) and the
secondary market for these securities was unexistant by the end of1997.
At the end of 1995, the stock of TPs (CB paper) reduced significantly as
well as the need for contractionary OMOS (see Graph 19). According to
some analysts (CB staff and external consultants, see Mas (1996)), there
seemed to be an opportunity to buy public securities in the secondary
Graph 18






























































































TES Clase B TES Clase A27
market for future OMOs. CB authorities and staff were increasingly aware
of the need to prepare for 1999, a year in which the CB would have to
operate exclusively trading government securities, as mandated by a 1993
law. However, the CB did not dare to take this step at this stage and
preferred to keep using TPs, while it continued to prepare its staff only
“mentally” or “intellectually” to this future challenge
17. Simultaneously, the
banking operations area of the CB started to seriously consider the
possibility of providing directly an electronic securities trading system and
centralizing its administration.
In late 1997 the stock of TPs depleted completely and at the onset of the
1998 events, the CB became, for the first time in recent history, a net
creditor to the interbank money market, as is clearly shown in Graph 19.
Back then, the CB had a standing facility for overnight liquidity needs. It
was ready to provide all the resources needed or demanded at a constant
rate of 28% nominal, called the CB Repo rate (Graph 20), against a set of
eligible paper (basically Central Bank TPs, TES-B and Finagros`s TDAs).
Soon the CB authorities were shocked and surprised to observe that
overnight interbank interest rates were well above the CB Repo rate and
that volatility in that market had started to increase after two years of great
stability. The demand for liquidity was growing and the CB was not able to
satisfy it against its will. Why?, because there was not enough stock of
eligible paper in the market.
In February 1998 the peso experienced the first of four speculative attacks
until the peso was left to float in September 1999. In that month, in contrast
with what was done in Chile, the CB authorities chose not to produce a
liquidity shock. They decided instead to increase the Repo rate to 30%,
willing to provide all the liquidity that was needed at that rate, while
leaving the exchange rate regime unmodified. For the better or the worse,
the interbank rate soared, followed by longer maturity rates. The CB was
loosing control over monetary policy, not only due to exchange rate fixing,
but because money markets and transmission mechanisms were failing to
work. To solve the securities’ stock constraints, the CB had to partially
implement monetary policy through collateralized credit auctions using
private sector claims as collateral as had done Mexico.
                                          
17 The CB sought for technical assisstance from the Central Bank of Spain during this period, as
the Spanish experience of Monetary Policy based on government security transactions was
viewed as a very sucessful one. So did the MoF to develop its domestic debt management
strategy.28
In addition to the lack of sufficient stock of government paper, the
available securities to obtain liquidity from the CB were being discounted
at very high rates by the CB (Graph  21). The reason was, once again,
related to public debt market underdevelopment: there were no reference
secondary market rates to be used to discount this paper. In the past, the CB
had created the following ad-hoc formula to calculate the discount rate for
TES and other securities: when there were no reference prices in the
secondary market, the CB would use the higher rate between the effective
Repo rate and DTF plus 7 points (DTF is the average 90 day deposit rate)
to rediscount public bonds. As is shown in Graph 21, this formula proved
to be too restrictive
18. When the second speculative attack took place just
before the presidential elections in May 1998, the CB decided to ration
liquidity and auctioned overnight facilities. As a result, the Repo rate
reached record hights (of more than 80% in one day of June). That meant
not only that central bank resources were extremely expensive, but that
almost twice the face value of collateral had to be put to obtain the rationed
amount of liquidity, given the discount rate for repo operations
19. In other
words, there was monetary over-adjustment due to factors that were, at that
moment, not foreseen nor entirely under the control of the CB authorities
and staff. In August 1999, discount rates were adjusted to more reasonable
levels.
                                          
18 Tying the discount rate to DTF had also the following dissadvantage: when there is flight for
quality and risk aversion, the spread between the rates charged by different institutions
increases substantially, increasing the average 90 day deposit rate.
19 Matters became worse as the CB started to manage payments under Real Time Gross
Settlement system in July, which of course increased the demand for loiquidity even further.




















































































































































































































































OMOs Net Credit to the Financial System29
In September 1998, after a very short period of dropping interesting rates,
the Russian crisis hit again the already distressed market and the exchange
rate band was depreciated 9%. This marked the beginning of a significantly
calmer period in monetary markets, but certainly less calmed on the
financial and last resort facility side, given the problems that started to arise
on the asset side of financial intermediaries. Monetary policy was
substantially loosened both through reserve requirement reductions and
substantial expansion and cheapening of Repo operations and rates. The
CB Repo rate has fallen systematically until present date, with the sole
exception of a couple of days when the fourth speculative attack took place
in the middle of 1999 and the peso was floated.
Graph 20. 
 Overnight market interest rate, Central Bank Overnight REPO rate and 















































































































































































































































































































Overnight Market Rate Central Bank Overnight Repo rate 90-day deposit reference rate30
The repo market has been extremely dynamic over the last year,
particularly due to CB OMOs
20. Today, the CB absorbs or provides
overnight and short term liquidity exclusively through repo or reverse repo
auctions and standing facilities. It conducts daily, weekly and bi-weekly
repo auctions using a uniform-price method against public securities
(mainly TES-B, but securities issued by Fogafin and Finagro, among other
public entities, are accepted). To meet end-of-day needs of the banks, there
are standing facilities against accepted collateral at a "Lombard" rate;
access to these facilities islimited only by the amount of collateral
available.  Reverse repos are also carried out on a daily basis (at present,
only through an end-of-day standing facility).
Apart from Repos, the CB has been involved since 1998 in outright
purchases of government securities (only TES-B) in the secondary market.
This is done on a weekly basis (every Friday) via a uniform price auction,
and sporadically (basically, when there are attractive opportunities) via
transactions through the electronic transaction system SEN. All financial
intermediaries that trade with the CB in ordinary Repo operations have
access to the auctions ("agentes colocadores de Omas"); they are not
                                          
20 The interbank repo market was, however, hurt by a financial transactions tax of 0.2% that was
levied for some months oin 1999 due to a Constittutional Court ruling.

















































































































































































































REPO RATE DISCOUNT RATE31
restricted to market makers. As shown in Graphs 19 and 22, in six months
the CB has more than doubled its stock of TES-B. This, of course, has also
helped to provide liquidity in the government securities market.
The implementation of outright purchases, however, has proved to be
difficult and with many contradictions. Firstly, given the mandate to
operate exclusively with government securities as from January 1999, and
the fact that the CB was ill prepared for that event, it had to start building
its stock of TES-B at a time when it was supposed to be following a
contractionary policy to defend the exchange rate band. The first auctions
therefore generated confusion and uncertainty about the true objectives of
monetary policy during the first half of 1998.
Secondly, as mentioned earlier, until very recently the CB did not want to
purchase paper that had been originally placed by non-market methods
(convenidas y forzosas). This helped to segmentate some fix rate issues
which were otherwise absolutely fungible. The electronic system
administered by the CB labels each issue and coupon with a specific code
indicating whether their primary placement took place at an auction or not.
In this way, the CB could identify “eligible” securities to purchase. Though
the CB recently eliminated the restriction to buy “convenidas”, the label
continues to exist in the system and those securities are still being
"punished" by the market with greater discount rates.
Thirdly, despite the fact that CB staff has tried to identify ex ante the most
liquid issues and has tried not to dry up the market for some of them
through its purchases, it has not been possible to avoid this effect. On one
hand, the lack of periodic reliable information and a well designed data
base makes the task of identifying suitable issues to buy makes life difficult
for the operations desk. On the other, in order to meet the monetary
objectives set by the CB Board, the CB operations desk had the mandate to
auction substantial amounts of liquidity during the second half of 1999. As
a result, the CB is today the main single holder of some security issues.
Hence, CB operations have had the mixed and contradictory effect of
providing liquidity to the securities market, while at the same time is
shrinking the already small stock of available public debt in the secondary
market. Otherwise, prices at CB auctions have yet not been too far from
secondary market quotes.32
V.  CONCLUSIONS
This paper ends with not very original conclusions. The following list of
policy recommendations could have been drawn from any paper on the
same subject on any emerging economy in the process of adjusting its
macroeconomy after a financial crisis:
1.  Continuous public debt accumulation is bad. In the case of
Colombia, it has been a true obstacle to achieve macroeconomic
stability since the beginning of the 1990s. To achieve sustainable
high growth rates public sector deficits must be phased out.
Colombian authorities are committed to a comprehensive
macroeconomic adjustment program under an EFF IMF agreement
which foresees a substantial reduction in public debt accumulation.
However, to achieve the desired targets, present asset losses in the
financial system must halt and more stable political and legal
conditions must prevail. Otherwise, more debt accumulation and/or
more inflation will be inevitable, and more unpleasant monetarist and
fiscal arithmetic will have to be done.
2.  Capital market underdevelopment played an important role in
making the 1998-99 crisis more costly than it otherwise would have
been. It reduced monetary policy effectiveness and helped make
interest rates more volatile.
3.  Apart from macroeconomic stability, capital market development
requires coordinated actions by economic authorities to guarantee a
suitable regulatory and institutional framework. In the case of the
market for public securities in particular, it also requires a clear and
transparent debt management strategy and coordinated actions with
monetary policy. At present, Colombian authorities lack a
comprehensive vision or strategy in this area. The aftermath of a
financial crisis could be a good opportunity to think these issues over
and design a strategy with the commitment of all public agencies that
affect the market directly or indirectly, including the Central Bank.
Among the specific issues that must be tackled we could mention the
folowing:
  there are regulatory restrictions that help to segmentate the market
and reduce liquidity
  there are too many types of public debt instruments in the market,
they are not fungible and most of their issues and/or series are
very small and illiquid33
  there is no complete yield curve and benchmark rates and no
perceived serious commitment to develop them among market
participants
  the primary dealer system may need adjustments and a more
credible commitment by both issuers and market makers
  the government should phase out arranged placements and
increase market-based issuing systems
  to the extent that SEN (the electronic system) continues to grow,
yields negotiated in that market should become benchmarks for
valuation and trading; the CB should be the first one to take this
step.34
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